


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World War, 1939-1945
U.S. Army. 6th Army Group. G-3 Section.
"World II - Final Report," 1945 Italy

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EUGENE L. HARRISON
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-2

74392

FINAL REPORT

G-3 SECTION
Headquarters, 6TH Army Group



WORLD WAR II

CLASSIFICATION
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DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE *AUB*
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HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
G-3 Section
APO 23, U. S. Army

Heidelberg, Germany.
1 July 1945.


SUBJECT: Final Report.

TO : The Chief of Staff.

1. The attached document is submitted as a Final Report, in narrative form, of some of the more important activities in which this office had a primary interest during operations of Headquarters 6th Army Group from its organization to 30 June 1945. No effort has been made to cover in detail or even mention many things of a minor nature, especially if they have no real historical value. Effort has been made to cover most items of major interest, which have historical value, in sufficient detail to indicate dates, actions taken, the reasons therefor, and the results produced, along with such correlative items as are pertinent and of interest. It will be noted that, except in one case, reference to the means and methods employed by 6th Army Group to deceive the German is omitted. It is believed that these matters should not be disclosed in this document.

2. In preparing this report effort has been made to deal with all activities by phases, and chronologically where possible. Every effort has been made to insure that facts such as dates, actions, reasons and results are correctly recorded and substantiated by records of this headquarters. However, conjectures, opinions and the like, which are readily identified in this report, do not necessarily represent the official records of this headquarters or the views of any officers or troops of this headquarters other than myself and the officers of the Planning Staff and Committee who collaborated in the compilation of this report. While it is not intended that this report should be considered as a history of 6th Army Group operations, it is intended that this report should amplify and supplement broadly the G-3 aspects of the History of Headquarters 6th Army Group which has been produced as a separate document; and it should be read in this light.

3. Time available has precluded presenting this report in as carefully chosen language and with the editorial nicety desired. Readers should bear this fact in mind when analyzing this report.



R. E. JENKINS
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

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Final
Report of G-3 Section
HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMY GROUP
1 July 1945

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CHAPTER TEN

REDUCTION OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL REDOUBT

The idea of a German National Redoubt based on the mountainous terrain of west Austria took shape gradually. Small bits of information gathered from all sources added credence to the story that German forces in the south would fall back to this rugged terrain, there to make a last ditch stand. Stories emanating from German sources indicated that large underground depots were well stocked and that elaborate plans had been prepared to defend the area based on the lateral communication afforded by the valleys of the Rhine, Ill, Inn and Salzach Rivers. None of this information appeared authoritative but the volume of it indicated that something was up, calling for plans to counteract such a move should the Germans attempt it.

As early as 02 April SHAEF directed 6th Army Group to be prepared to launch a thrust on the axis Nurnburg - Regensburg - Linz to prevent consolidation of German resistance in the south.

Until after the crossing of the Rhine, the occupation of Austria had been considered an AFHQ undertaking. With the continued advance of 6th Army Group forces towards the south and southeast, it became apparent that German forces in Italy were not to be withdrawn to bolster the crumbling western front. This clearly indicated that the initial force entering Central and Western Austria might well be composed of ETO rather than MTO troops.

About 22 April Lieutenant Colonel Stromberg from SHAEF, G-3 Plans section arrived at Headquarters 6th Army Group with SHAEF's latest thinking in the form of a staff study which had not yet been formally approved by SCAEF. A hasty meeting of the J.P.S. was called at which he presented orally the contents of the paper answering questions as they arose. The object of his visit was to assist planning in the 6th Army Group designed to prevent, if possible, a protracted defense in the National Redoubt. We did not believe in the theory of a completed National Redoubt. What we did consider as a possibility was that the German forces being driven south by the French and U. S. Armies, and west by the Russians would be forced into Austria where, if given time, they could put up formidable resistance. Our principal aim was to destroy completely German Army Group G before it could reach the National Redoubt area in our zone of action. How successful we would be in this was soon to be disclosed.

The enemy's disorganization as of 28 April is well described in the Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 32 bearing that date, the essence of which follows:

That portion of CinC West's command (Nineteenth German Army and First German Army) opposite 6th Army Group failed to receive

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sufficient reinforcements during the week to aid in either the reestablishment of a front line or even to replace the approximately 78,650-odd troops lost as prisoners of war during the period 21-26 April, exclusive of permanent casualties. The inability of the enemy to halt the eastward drive toward Ulm and Kempten rolled up the Suabian Mountain positions and turned the Danube River line. This drive coupled with advances to the south through the places mentioned above effectively disorganized and practically destroyed Nineteenth Army. Farther to the east, friendly armor has broken contact between Seventh and First German Armies. This was the situation most to be avoided by Army Group G. The result is that First Army is practically isolated and must fight an independent action with exposed flanks for the defence of Munich.

First German Army was unable to find suitable connected terrain features upon which it could reestablish a front line against unremitting Allied pressure. Its rearward progress has continued for the second successive week. The appearance of Vlassov Russians and Hungarian troops in front line positions could not effect the very great need for artillery pieces, ammunition, motor transport and tanks. The position forced upon First German Army, isolated by the deep wedge driven into its right flank and disintegration of the Nineteenth Army on its left flank, will compel its early withdrawal to the Austrian Border. The Army will be forced back to cover the city of Munich, but due to the unavailability of any cross corridors of strong natural defensive positions in the vicinity, the city will fall rapidly. However, Himmler, who is reported in Munich, may urge a final German "Sacrifice" for this town.

Nineteenth German Army suffered a tremendous and overwhelming defeat at the hands of the fast moving First French Army. The ranks of the enemy were cut into numerous pockets and then individually mopped up. The rate of attrition was so high that the enemy's capability of restoring its ranks was not possible of fulfillment. Nineteenth Army will probably have the doubtful honor of being the first enemy army to arrive in the so called "Redoubt" area. It will probably have the mission of manning the few defensive positions already constructed in the Bregenz-Innsbruck area, as well as that of constructing new defenses. The remnants of Nineteenth Army, after having lost approximately 50,000 prisoners of war during the past week, can only hope to delay their day of capitulation.

Capabilities

The enemy may be allowed only two actual capabilities:

- (1) He can surrender unconditionally.
- (2) He can continue his senseless immolation, fighting hopelessly from isolated strongpoints as his lines disintegrate.

The overwhelming military defeat of the German armies north of the Danube and in the Black Forest, the dwindling resources both of men and material remaining to the enemy, and the increasingly obvious war-weariness of the civilian population all combine to make a political capitulation imminent. The hold of the Nazi overlords upon the Wehrmacht and the people is definitely weakening, particularly in Bavaria. The civilian finds himself in a position of fighting for the protection of his home and possessions not against the Allies, but against the fanatics who will not or may not accept defeat. As for the German soldier, prisoner of war status has become certainly more inviting than the prospect of further resistance under conditions of extreme privation.

Should the Nazis choose to resist, whether through a blind but monumental faith in ultimate victory or through simple acceptance of their own fate, their resistance will be short lived. The north-south valleys of Bavaria offer no tenable defensive positions and will serve as avenues into Austria. His inferiority in guns, supplies, mobility and total lack of air support are so complete that even field losses cannot be replaced. Feverish activity now in the development of defensive positions in Austria denotes a realization that he waited too long to make the "National Redoubt" a fact. The enemy is militarily completely defeated; he will be allowed neither respite nor truce, choose whichever he will.

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As a result of Lt. Col. Stromberg's visit, G-3 directed the JPS to prepare a plan to forestall, if possible, organized resistance in Austria by destroying Army Group G and blocking the passes into that country in our zone of action. Prior to receipt of this information from SHAEF our mission had been to seize and occupy that part of Austria and Germany in our zone. This new information and the confirming directive which followed later, gave us specific critical areas in the Redoubt Area as physical objectives against which we should concentrate our effort. We found that it was necessary for us to have Rosenheim in our zone of action in order to give us free use of the roads leading into the valley of the Inn from the east. This was incorporated in the SHAEF directive which did not arrive until 27 April. The JPS plan, which was approved by General Devers 24 April, resulted in the dispatch of a cable to Seventh and First French Armies at once. A paraphrase of the cable follows:

First French Army will advance with strong mobile forces to rapidly seize Bregenz - Feldkirch area, sealing the Austrian-Swiss Border and thereafter be prepared to continue the advance to capture Landeck.

Seventh Army will advance rapidly with main effort on the right, with strong mobile forces to block the passes into Austria along the German border in zone preventing the escape of the withdrawing enemy from the north, and thereafter dispatch strong mobile forces to seize Innsbruck-Brenner Pass area and thereafter be prepared to assist in the capture of Landeck by First French Army.

Armies will prepare plans for resupply by air.

On 25 April General Devers held a Command and Staff conference at Headquarters 6th Army Group at 11 o'clock attended by General Patch, his G-2, G-3 and G-4 and by the Chief of Staff, Assistant G-3 and G-4 of First French Army. The object of the conference was to discuss the operation outlined in the cable dispatched to the Armies the day before. The Army Group Commander's idea was to have the First French Army drive to the south while the Seventh Army pivoted on its left and swung east in order to close the exits of the passes leading into Austria. At this time, no official directive had been received from SHAEF other than the informal information that had been given by Lt. Col. Stromberg. General Patch agreed with the concept of the maneuver and told General Devers that the Seventh Army part of it was already under way based on our cable received the day before. The Chief of Staff, First French Army, was in agreement but was in doubt about their ability to get through the defense of the Bregenz area rapidly.

By 28 April it had become apparent that Army Group G had been badly cut up. Prisoners were being taken in tremendous numbers, and VI Corps and the right of the XXI Corps met practically no opposition other than some isolated groups as they rapidly started their swing. VI Corps headed south with its right and began to turn its center and its left toward the east which, of course, had the effect of swinging XXI Corps' right which was also free. The First French Army, in the meantime, was having its difficulties with logistical and infantry support of its armor. It had failed to get the proper infantry support behind its armor and was not making the progress hoped for. By the time it got its infantry up VI Corps was well to the south.

By the evening of 29 April, it was definitely clear that Seventh Army could get to Landeck with VI Corps' right much before First French Army could reach the area. Therefore, on 30 April the boundary between Armies was extended south from Hofen so as to give Landeck and the communication routes thereto to Seventh Army. At this time, VI Corps' right was well into the Alps. It was now apparent that we had beaten the Germans to the area, that they would not be able to get into the area by using routes west of Salzburg. XXI Corps was moving its armor rapidly, backing it up by motorized infantry, swinging its right along the edge of the Alps south of Munich. It seemed assured of reaching the entrance to the pass at Rosenheim leading up to the valley of the Inn and cutting the retreating Germans off. So it was simply a question of time before the Innsbruck-Brenner Pass area would fall. This left the enemy only one route into the mountain area through the pass in the Salzburg area.

XXI Corps' maneuver was pinching out XV Corps which had been the pivot of the Army maneuver. XV Corps, instead of facing south, was now facing the gap at Salzburg from the northeast on XXI Corps' left. The boundary between Army Groups at this time was just to the west of Chiem Lake. Salzburg was in the zone of action of the Third Army,

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which was still north and northeast of XV Corps' left. Third Army with its long, exposed and lightly held left flank was unwilling to advance on the Salzach River corridor until sufficient infantry had been brought up to assist its armor and adequately protect its left flank. It became quite apparent that the boundary between Army Groups should be changed and that XV Corps should head for Salzburg along with the left of XXI Corps. Both were much closer to it than Third Army. The Salzburg Pass had to be sealed off quickly.

Seventh Army was anxious to get the Army Group boundary changed in order to get XV Corps into Salzburg. General Devers directed G-3 to take the necessary action to effect the change in Army Group boundary which would make possible the contemplated maneuver. The whole transaction was handled by telephone between 6th Army Group, 12th Army Group and SHAEF and cleared up in one day. It is interesting to note that within 24 hours all arrangements necessary to change the principal maneuver of two Army Groups had been completed and all the action to implement them had been taken, even down to the divisions in most cases. This was fast work. It was possible because interested persons were able to talk over the secret telephone in "double talk" in a way that anyone not thoroughly familiar with the conversation could not understand. Many details were handled by cub plane.

6th Army Group's mission was changed in answer to the above oral agreement by a SHAEF cable dated 3 May 1945, giving to the Southern Group of Armies the mission of seizing the Landeck and Innsbruck areas, sealing the Brenner Pass, capturing Salzburg, seizing the Bruck-Radstadt area and occupying that portion of Austria in zone of action. The boundary was revised eastward as follows:

As before to Freising (to 12th Army Group) Muhlendorf - thence along Inns River to its junction with Salzach River (to 6th Army Group) - Strazwalchen (to 12th Army Group) - Bad Isch - Schladming - Manterndorfvillach (to 6th Army Group).

From the point of view of 6th Army Group, the decision which gave the Salzburg area to Seventh Army was probably the decision which brought about the immediate collapse of the Germans in southern Germany. XXI and XV Corps were able to move into the former zone of action of Third Army by an open flank and block Salzburg Pass with great rapidity. Without this decision, the Germans in front of Third Army's right flank would have poured into the Alps area through the Salzburg Pass and we might have had a tough time getting them out.

While the above maneuver was underway, VI Corps advanced rapidly southward and cut the main east-west route through the Redoubt by capturing Innsbruck and Landeck, and moved on south through the Brenner and Resia Passes.

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With all passes into the mountain country sealed and German Army Group G completely slashed into a state of disorganization (Figure 25) the Commander was ready to confer with General Devers regarding surrender.


On the afternoon of 3 May, General Devers was informed by SHAEF that General Kesselring had asked General Wolf who was in command of the surrendered SS Troops in Northern Italy, to find out with whom he should deal regarding a surrender of the German forces in the Austrian area. General Barr was directed to send a cable to AFHQ asking them to have Kesselring informed that he should deal with General Devers, Commanding General, 6th Army Group. In the cable Kesselring was told how his representatives should approach and where they should come through the Allied lines. It was later discovered that Schulz, CG Army Group G, and not Kesselring, was surrendering. General Devers, in the meantime, had directed General Barr and G-3, to draw up the instrument of surrender. This was done on the night of the 3rd, being presented to the General Staff for consideration the next morning. In the meantime, General Devers, took a copy of the terms and went forward to the Command Post of the XV Corps situated at Haar, Bavaria. At about 1500 4 April, G-3 was directed to proceed to the Headquarters VI Corps with a copy of the terms as agreed upon by the Staff. These terms were to be used by General Brooks as a guide for the terms of surrender that he should use in current negotiations with representatives of the German Nineteenth Army. The 6th Army Group's terms were delivered to General Brooks' Headquarters at 0150, 5 May by G-3 who later proceeded to Haar to join General Devers.

General Devers, General Patch, General Haislip, General O'Daniels, General Ott, General Menoher, General Jenkins and Lieutenant Colonel Cabot Lodge were assembled at Headquarters XV Corps, Haar, Bavaria, at about 11:30 A.M. 5 May. About 12:45 P.M. General Devers was informed that a German delegation headed by the Commanding General, 1st German Army, Lieutenant General Foertsch, representing General Schulz, Commander of Army Group G, had arrived at the meeting place at the edge of town. General Devers directed his party to proceed at once by automobile to the meeting place to receive the German delegation. The meeting place was in a German sculptor's studio in a very beautiful setting at the edge of town. The studio had several large beautiful rooms, one of which had been prepared for the occasion by the Chief of Staff, XV Corps.

Upon arrival of the party at the meeting place, the German delegation could be seen standing in a group off to the right in the yard in front of the building. As the U. S. party dismounted the German delegation came to attention. No salutes were exchanged. General Devers' party entered the building, and went directly to the room which had been arranged. Shortly after entering, General Devers handed a copy of the terms of surrender to Chief of Staff XV Corps and asked him to deliver it to the Chief of the German delegation.

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SITUATION
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
4 MAY 45

Figure 25.

Figure 25

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General Menoher delivered the copy to General Foertsch who requested 30 minutes in which to study the document. This request was granted. Shortly after 1:30 P.M. General Devers took the seat at the head of the table and the officers of his party were arranged on his right in order, General Patch, General Haislip, General O'Daniel, General Jenkins, General Ott and General Menoher. The Lieutenant interpreter entered with General Foertsch who was introduced by General Menoher. General Foertsch stood at attention and bowed from the hips. There was no exchange of salutes or other greetings. General Foertsch took seat at the end of the table opposite General Devers. The interpreter sat between General Menoher and General Foertsch.

General Menoher then requested that General Foertsch's staff which consisted of approximately eight officers be brought in and seated. Six of them took seats on the right of General Foertsch at the table. Two junior officers took seats along the wall of the room on the German side of the table. General Menoher then introduced the U.S. party in the order of their seating, beginning with General Devers. The American representatives remained seated as they were introduced. General Foertsch was then invited to introduce his own staff. He rose and introduced his staff, apparently in order of rank. Each German officer rose and bowed as he was introduced.

Formalities completed, General Devers opened the discussion by asking General Foertsch if he had read and understood the terms of surrender. It was brought out that some misunderstanding of the word "term" was prevalent in the German party. The German equivalent of "term" implies conditions. Since this was an unconditional surrender, General Devers directed that the word "specifications" be substituted for "term" in the instrument of surrender to avoid any misunderstanding.

The conference was recorded and the bulk is included here with a view to giving an idea of the state of collapse of German Army Group G and the attitude of General Foertsch, representing its commander.

Gen. Devers: It is understood that this is unconditional surrender.

Gen. Foertsch: I understand.

Gen. Devers: This is a specification as to how we will carry out that condition.

Gen. Foertsch: I understand.

Gen. Devers: The first part of this instrument to be filled in is what territory is covered by this instrument. Will you give us that?

Gen. Foertsch: May I say this: I have the order and authorization to talk for the whole Army Group "G". This group comprises all forces of the First Army and of the Nineteenth Army, and the whole territory which has been marked on these maps by a line on the East, South and West. I assume that the Northern demarkation line will be the one which is in force at the moment the truce becomes effective.

Gen. Devers: What is the Northern line which is in force now?

Gen. Foertsch: The present front line is correct. This would mean that from the time of the truce initially there will be no movements by Allied forces into the territory which is at present held by the German forces. Will it be necessary to mark this Northern boundary on the map or will it be sufficient if a certain small zone will separate the two front lines?

Gen. Devers: You mean on the North?

Gen. Jenkins: The North boundary of the Germans is the present Allied front line, Sir.

Gen. Devers: I don't see how it affects us in the Northern boundary.

Gen. Haislip: It gives them four boundaries.

Gen. Jenkins: It would include troops in certain areas. On the South by the Italian-Swiss frontier, on the West by the Rhine River, and on the North by our front line.

Gen. Devers: Why do we need a space?

Gen. Foertsch: There would not be any space needed. I would consider it satisfactory for all troops to stay where they are at the time of the truce. As a matter of principle I want to point out the following. I have received orders from Field Marshal Kesselring to talk for Army Group "G". The Army Group "G" is under the orders of Field Marshal Kesselring. However, Field Marshal Kesselring, besides the forces of Army Group "G", is the Commander-in-Chief of other forces outside of the territory of Army Group "G". I would therefore propose, as a matter of principle, that in this instrument, wherever the name of Field Marshal Kesselring appears, there will be substituted the name of the Commander of Army Group "G", General Schulz. This instrument would then conform to the authorization I have brought along. It is intended that General Schulz's staff will be the staff for the surrender and execution of all terms set forth in this instrument.

- Gen. Devers: I assume that none of the other forces of Field Marshal Kesselring are within the boundary of the territory just given me.
- Gen. Foertsch: This is correct for Field Marshal Kesselring besides commands a territory in the Southeast. However, in this territory there are no forces which actually belong in the territory of the Southeast. In other words, all forces which are now in this territory would come under the provisions of this instrument. What we want is to change the name of Field Marshal Kesselring to the name of the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group "G", General Schulz.
- Gen. Devers: It is agreed to the change: to use Army Group "G" and the name of General Schulz.
- Gen. Foertsch: No, instead of the name of Field Marshal Kesselring the name of the Commander of Army Group "G", General Schulz.
- Gen. Devers: In any case Field Marshal Kesselring and his staff and other forces in this area must also surrender unconditionally.
- Gen. Foertsch: It is something which I would have to find out because I cannot decide regarding the person of Field Marshal Kesselring or his personal staff but only all forces in Army Group "G".
- Gen. Devers: We will close this instrument out on the basis of Army Group "G".
- Gen. Foertsch: Yes, Commander, General Schulz. Questions regarding the staff of Field Marshal Kesselring will still have to be clarified. To clear this up might take a certain time, depending on the means of communication. I ask that independent of this question the time of the armistice will be settled. I guarantee that Field Marshal Kesselring will in no case give other directions regarding Army Group "G".
- Gen. Devers: There will be no armistice. We will set the time, and that is when this instrument will be effective. If we should during that time run across anybody that is in this area, they will simply become prisoners of war.
- Gen. Foertsch: Up to the time of the truce.
- Gen. Devers: How long will it take to notify the troops?

Gen. Foertsch: I will welcome it, if the truce according to paragraph 2 could be put into effect as soon as possible. I propose tomorrow, 12 noon, May 6.

Gen. Devers: Satisfactory.

Gen. Foertsch: I would appreciate it if for the announcement of this time limit I could have the support of General Devers to be able to get the effective time to my troops as quickly as possible.

Gen. Devers: We will assist in every way possible.

Gen. Foertsch: I ask regarding paragraph 3, until further notice, officers and such personnel which are necessary to maintain order will be permitted to keep their small arms for reason of discipline. I am talking about officers, MP's and roving MP's which are to keep order in the territory, and I think that it will be to our mutual interest because in only this way can we guarantee discipline and order.

Gen. Devers: Small arms?

Gen. Foertsch: This includes pistols, rifles and machine pistols - no machine guns.

Gen. Devers: How many troops are involved?

Gen. Foertsch: I cannot give an exact number. Normally within a division there is one company of MPs. That would be about 100 men in a division. Those 100 men do not include the officers. It would be very difficult for me to give any definite number, but I believe honestly that from this measure will never result any threat to the strong Allied forces.

Gen. Devers: Granted.

Gen. Foertsch: The reason for my asking this is the following: We have difficulties regarding food. In this territory there are very many evacuees which have gone there on account of air attacks. For this reason there would be a possibility that riots or looting by some soldiers might occur. I think that it is also in the interest of the Allied forces that such dangers should be suppressed right from the start, and this is the actual reason for this request. I am particularly grateful to you for acceding to my request.

Gen. Devers: How can the bearers of arms be distinguished?

Gen. Foertsch: All the MPs wear some metal shield - some form of plaquette. Roving patrols wear some kind of fourragere. They can be very easily distinguished from other troops for reasons of discipline in the German Army.

Gen. O'Daniel: They should all wear a 3-inch white brassard on their left arm.

Gen. Devers: If they were to wear some white brassard there would be no trouble - officers and men.

Gen. Foertsch: I think that every officer could be very easily distinguished even without it by his shoulder straps.

Gen. Devers: Our soldiers won't see them in the distance.

Gen. Foertsch: The officers would carry only pistols - nothing else. If however an officer for reasons of order carries more than a pistol, he too has to wear a white brassard.

Gen. Devers: It is up to the officer if he wants to take the chance on it.

Gen. Foertsch: I don't think anybody would shoot at an officer who carries a pistol just like that. I would propose to talk this over in detail. We will not cause any difficulties. I would propose re paragraph 4, concentration of equipment and personnel, a period of 48 hours after the truce.

Gen. Devers: That is granted - beginning noon tomorrow.

Gen. Foertsch: In other words, it would be the 8th of May - noon - 12 o'clock.

Gen. Devers: That is alright. (Watches were checked for coordination)

Gen. Foertsch: May I bring up the following question in reference to paragraph 4. In the Annex it says that all arms, weapons and ammunition should be put in dumps by troops, companies and batteries. Do we understand that each troop, company or battery puts all its arms in their own dump or do you want one big dump for a division?

Gen. Devers: We prefer one dump.

Gen. Foertsch: In this case I would need a little more time to collect them all in one dump.

Gen. Devers: We mean to collect them in as big a dump as possible in the time given.

Gen. Foertsch: The size of the dumps will depend largely on the means of transport we have available. To collect them in any larger dumps would be very difficult for the following reasons: We have very little fuel, if any, and the road conditions in the territory are very difficult.

Gen. Devers: That is the reason we set it in this form. You can put it in large or smaller dumps, as you want - not below a company.

Gen. Foertsch: It is O.K. Regarding the sentence that all these dumps should be guarded by unarmed sentries, I doubt very much that it would be practicable. There are very many foreign laborers in the region.

Gen. Devers: The guards can have arms for that purpose, and when we take over, the guards can turn in their arms.

Gen. Foertsch: It is quite alright. In reference to the sentence that all military equipment such as radio, telephone, telegraph and motor vehicles will have to be assembled and guarded, I assume it will be permitted to keep such transport as is needed to regulate traffic and bring up supplies; also to keep such means of communication needed by the staff to give orders to their troops. Otherwise no staff would have the necessary means of transporting the arms from one place to the other. This would include a few radio stations and, to allay any suspicion, all orders would be given in the clear.

Gen. Devers: That is approved so long as you are carrying out the administrative features of this instrument. After that they will be turned in.

Gen. Foertsch: That is clear. To get food, fuel, etc. to the troops, especially food, we will need a certain number of motor vehicles as well as horse-drawn vehicles for a certain length of time.

Gen. Jenkins: That is taken care of in paragraph 3.

Gen. Foertsch: Referring to the Annex, paragraph 3, where you desire that all our troops collect away from and keep clear of highways, railroads, etc., I don't think this is practicably possible. This, because they are in a mountainous territory with very few roads. If the troops are to keep alive and to get any provisions whatsoever, they will have to use the roads.

Gen. Devers: You will have to give us a troop list and pin-point where your units are, and we will put liaison officers with the units. Where they need to use the roads, we will provide for it.

Gen. Foertsch: What kind of movement of Allied troops do you contemplate when you say that routes of advance may be required by Allied forces?

Gen. Devers: Just freedom of roads in the area for movement of troops - for concentration or war.

Gen. Foertsch: According to that we would have to figure on the possibility that in this territory which you are talking about an American division might appear some day.

Gen. Devers: They will appear.

Gen. Foertsch: Yes, you will send liaison staffs and controlling commissions. Will this territory also be occupied by American troops immediately?

Gen. Devers: Yes, because we are going to establish military government therein.

Gen. Foertsch: Could you give an idea when your troops would move in - starting from the time of the truce?

Gen. Devers: Probably two days.

Gen. Foertsch: I consider it my duty to point out that it would be very difficult to billet any troops on account of the present over-crowding.

Gen. Devers: We have that problem already. We propose to handle it quickly and firmly, and I don't anticipate any more trouble than we have had already.

Gen. Foertsch: The terrain is of Alpine character, has very few towns and villages, and few means of communication, and is very badly off as far as any food is concerned. Even now there are places where you cannot find a piece of bread.

Gen. Devers: We realize the difficulties.

Gen. Foertsch: In paragraph 4 of the Annex you give us 72 hours to render you an order of battle of all major units. I do not know exactly how detailed you will want this list, but in any case the time is very brief. In 72 hours we could easily give you a list which, for

instance, would give the "82nd Regiment with three companies", or something like it but if you wish a more detailed list, additional time will be required.

Gen. Patch. If you have radio communication and use it in the clear, why should you need more than 72 hours?

Gen. Foertsch: Due to the present fighting, all these units have been so mixed up that it is impossible for us to have an exact strength report. I want to stress this as I consider it my duty to be honest so that no one can say later on that we did not act in good faith.

Gen. Devers: We accept. Do the best you can in that time and then continue to make the list more complete.

Gen. Foertsch: This is all I have to say regarding this document. However, I have a few things of importance I desire to bring out. I mentioned before the great difficulties in the food problem. Our troops have food for about 6 to 8 days. There has never been sufficient food within this territory to feed the troops which are in there now. I therefore deem it necessary to come to an agreement, the details to be worked out later, according to which we would be able to continue buying food also farther to the North, outside of this territory.

Gen. Devers: I think you must understand that your army will be moved just as soon as we can get it moved, and that they are not going to subsist where they are forever. I don't anticipate there is going to be any difficulty in making arrangements whereby your troops will have enough food, but we cannot authorize you to leave this territory to go North into somebody else's territory to buy food because we control all the food in all the territory which we occupy.

Gen. Foertsch: I would like to know when you say that our troops would be moved from the area as soon as possible, whether you mean that they will be used again in civilian occupation or whether they will be sent away as prisoners of war.

Gen. Devers: They will all be prisoners of war. If you mean are we going to send them out of the country, that is something beyond my pale. We will abide by the rules of war.

Gen. Foertsch: In other words, this would mean we would have to consider ourselves Prisoners of War within a very short time?

Gen. Devers: Yes, there is no armistice. This is a complete surrender.

Gen. Foertsch: In this connection I would like to ask another question. If I understand you right on this, the prisoners of war will be used in a capacity beneficial to the German people as soon as possible. However, will the other Allies avoid that these German prisoners fall into the hands of the Russians.

Gen. Devers: That is something on the level I have nothing to do with. Will you state that question more clearly?

Gen. Foertsch: Does the American High Command intend to hand over any prisoners made by the American troops to Soviet Russia?

Gen. Devers: I can't answer that question for the higher command.

Gen. Foertsch: I am very grateful to General Devers; especially I want to thank him in the name of my comrades who are now prisoners of war and who, as I hope, are and will remain in the hands of gentlemen.

Gen. Devers: We will abide by the rules of war. We will have the papers retyped to conform to the suggested changes. I will sign and you can sign later.

Gen. Foertsch: I think it might be a good idea to immediately advise my command of the time of the truce so that no time will be lost. I want to advise my higher command by all means which will be put at my disposal.

Gen. Devers: Perfectly alright. How do you propose doing that?

Gen. Foertsch: In any way which suits you will be suitable to us. I would prefer a marked plane of a cub type to fly over and advise the High Command.

Gen. Devers: What you want to do is to notify your command?

Gen. Foertsch: It would be good if one of my officers went by cub plane, and I would like to send word by radio to my CP which is at Saalfelden, near Zell Am See. There is no regular airfield nearby. On my part, I would like to do everything possible to prevent any further bloodshed.

(It was suggested that General Foertsch make use of the 3rd Division facilities for this purpose).

Gen. Devers: Make arrangements for this. Understand, this is unconditional surrender.

Gen. Foertsch: I have no power to do anything against this. I have one request in this connection. You are also the Commander of the troops of de Gaulle. The German people would be greatly indebted to you, Sir, if you would be able to give some attention to the behavior of the French troops. One of my officers yesterday had an experience which I do not want to mention here in detail.

Gen. Devers: The French troops under my command will obey the rules of war.

The instrument of surrender follows:

Specifications of Surrender, presented by General Jacob L. Devers, U. S. Army, Commanding 6th Army Group, on behalf of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, U. S. Army, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and accepted by General Schulz, Commander-in-Chief, Army Group "G", Army of the German Reich.

1. It is agreed that the territory covered by this instrument includes the areas bounded on the East generally by the line: Kirchberg (inclusive) - Ried (inclusive) - Frankenmarkt (inclusive) - Freudenthal (inclusive) - South Corner Zeller See - Radstadt (inclusive) - Oberdrauburg (exclusive) - Plocken Pass (exclusive), on the South by the Italian and Swiss frontiers, on the East by the River Rhine, and on the North by the present Allied front line, which are under the jurisdiction of General Schulz. All German military and para-military forces in this area are under command of General Schulz. All these forces, including General Schulz, are bound by this instrument and shall be subject to such other specifications as may be applied hereafter by the authorities of the United Nations.

2. All forces, including all para-military forces, under command of General Schulz, shall cease unconditionally all acts of hostilities towards forces of the United Nations not later than 1200B hours, 6 May 1945.

3. All such forces under command of General Schulz, except as indicated in Annex A, shall disarm themselves immediately and remain in their present areas retaining all mess and transportation equipment, food and forage necessary for self maintenance and subsistence until directed otherwise by authorities of the Armed Forces of the United Nations.

4. Concentration of all equipment and personnel as prescribed in Annex A will be effected not later than 1200B hours, 8 May 1945, after which time offensive ground and air action will be taken by the Allied Forces against all unauthorized movement of forces affected by this instrument. Other instructions indicated in Annex A will be carried out promptly.

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5. This instrument is independent of, without prejudice to, and will be superceded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to Germany and the German Armed Forces as a whole.

6. The official language of this instrument shall be the English text.

Signed and agreed at Haar, Bavaria, this 5 day of May 1945.

For General Schulz

Commanding General, First
German Army.

General Jacob L. Devers
United States Army

ANNEX "A"

1. Pending further orders all officers and not to exceed one hundred other ranks per division may retain their rifle, machine pistol, pistol, or other sidearm for internal security purposes. All such armed personnel will wear a 3-inch white arm band above the left elbow for easy identification. All other arms, weapons and ammunition of whatever nature will be placed in dumps of appropriate size in convenient locations in areas occupied by companies, troops, batteries, and other detachments of a comparable or smaller size. Appropriate guards will be posted on all such dumps to insure their security pending further disposition as directed by authorities of the Armed Forces of the United Nations. All military equipment such as telephone, telegraph and radio equipment, motor vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles and other means of transport (both ground and air), and other movable military impedimenta not needed for execution of these specifications will be similarly assembled and guarded in convenient locations pending their further disposition. All such dumps will be kept clear of lines of communication and axes of advance required by the Allied Forces.

2. All weapons and equipment will be deposited in dumps with breech blocks, bolts, sights and/or other operating mechanisms intact.

3. Having disposed of all weapons, ammunition and combat equipment of whatever nature, all forces under command of General Schulz will stand fast in their respective areas until given further direction by authorities of the Armed Forces of the United Nations, and will keep clear of all highways, railroads, trails and other routes of advance which may be required by Allied Forces.

4. By hour and date indicated in paragraph 2 this instrument, General Schulz shall furnish the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, an order of battle of all major units, including Allied Prisoner of War Camps, concentration camps and similar installations under his

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command, and as soon as possible shall furnish the Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, with a complete troop list showing by unit designation, type, strength and location, all elements of his command affected by this instrument.

5. All minefields within areas controlled by General Schulz shall be plainly marked immediately by signs and shall be outlined with white tape or other suitable means which are readily identifiable. All mines, booby traps and other types of demolition charges shall be removed from all highways and railroad bridges, tunnels, overpasses and underpasses on all lines of communication and from all buildings and means of transport, highway, rail and air, within the areas controlled by General Schulz, and all such mines, booby traps and other means of demolitions so removed shall be rendered harmless; those mines, booby traps and other means of demolitions which cannot be removed and rendered harmless immediately shall be plainly marked and placed under guards.

The conference broke up promptly. The terms were rewritten to include the minor changes agreed upon in the discussion, while the American and German officers had lunch separately. Shortly after 1500, 5 May, General Devers signed the original and one copy of the revised instrument, and directed that General Patch and General Haislip do likewise. Thereafter, in the presence of General Menoher and General Jenkins, as well as the members of General Foertsch's staff, General Foertsch re-read the document and signed the original. A copy was then handed to General Foertsch. The German staff, which had been standing, immediately came to rigid attention; and the General and his staff literally bowed out of the picture.

Thus the single purpose of 6th Army Group, destruction of the German Armies opposing it, was completed in dramatic fashion. This news was flashed to the world at once. But we were replaced in the spotlight two days later by the all important announcement that the entire German war machine on the fronts to our east and to our north, following the example of Army Group "G", had also surrendered unconditionally to our Supreme Commander and to our Russian allies.

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CHAPTER ELEVENPOST HOSTILITIES ACTIVITIES

The terms of surrender were fulfilled and hostilities ceased on the Seventh Army front as soon as orders could be disseminated throughout German lower echelons. Some confusion and resistance by isolated German units occurred in front of First French Army. This opposition was soon overcome after several pitched battles. German units involved were from Twenty-Fourth Army.

Headquarters 6th Army Group's Military Missions to higher German Headquarters were established. Brigadier General Henry C. Wolfe of Headquarters 6th Army Group arrived at Central Hotel in Ell on 11 May to take charge of the Military Mission to Headquarters German Army Group "C" which had previously been set up by a Seventh Army liaison detachment. Colonel K. S. Andersson of Headquarters 6th Army Group headed the mission to German Nineteenth Army and arrived at Pfunds on 11 May. The Military Missions supervised the carrying out of the surrender, transmitted additional instructions to implement the occupational policies and formed liaison headquarters for transmittal to the higher Allied Headquarters for decision such requests and problems of the surrendered German forces as could not be dealt with on the spot. The missions also facilitated the movement of occupational forces into the areas of the surrendered German forces.

Advance to the south was resumed by Seventh Army and First French Army at noon on 8 May to complete the occupation of their respective zones in Austria. The Italian and Swiss Frontiers and the Enns River line on the east were set as the limits of advance.

The principal problems which required coordination by higher Allied headquarters were those of feeding and maintaining the large number of German forces concentrated in the Alpine districts. Initial German food supplies were estimated to be sufficient for about six to eight days or until about 13 May. It was reported on 11 May that 200,000 German troops were moving from the southeast toward the 6th Army Group area in Austria. Later this group appeared to be I German Cavalry Corps which claimed to have been discharged by British forces. AFHQ was requested to intercept and prevent movement of the reported troops from its area of responsibility. Before the situation was settled control of Seventh Army and the responsibility for the areas involved were passed to Headquarters 12th Army Group.

In order to facilitate redistribution of forces and formulate a coordinated plan of occupation by the headquarters which would have responsibility for the U. S. Zone, General Devers and General Bradley agreed at a meeting held in Heidelberg on 14 May 1945 that Seventh Army should pass to control of Headquarters 12th Army Group without delay. SHAEF approved this agreement and ordered the 12th Army Group

to assume command of Seventh Army on 16 May 1945. General Bradley, however, did not want responsibility for First French Army during the interim period of settlement of the French Zone of Occupation and assumption of responsibility therefor by the French Government. General Bradley's reasons for this were the unfamiliarity of Headquarters 12th Army Group with problems of French organization and supply, the lack of previous personal contact and lack of familiarity with the established communications and liaison which Headquarters 6th Army Group had with First French Army. It was therefore agreed between the Army Group Commanders that First French Army would remain under command of Headquarters 6th Army Group until SHAEF should release First French Army to control of the French Government.


On 21 June SHAEF indicated by cable that agreement had been concluded on final delimitation of the French National Zone of Occupation in Germany and transfer of areas of responsibility was imminent. (See Figure 26). SHAEF directed that plans for transfer of areas be prepared to become effective on or about 1 July 1945, but that First French Army could not be contacted on the matter for the time being. A preliminary plan was prepared and approved by the Chief of Staff 23rd June and discussed on that day with Headquarters 12th Army Group and SHAEF.

A conference was held at Headquarters 6th Army Group 25 June attended by representatives of SHAEF, COMZONE, Headquarters 12th Army Group, Third, Seventh, Fifteenth Armies, Conad, Adsec, Oise Intermediate Section and Ninth Air Force. The tentative plan was discussed at the meeting and approved after slight modifications. The plan was submitted to SHAEF with 12th Army Group concurrence the following day.

On 27th June, SHAEF authorized discussion with First French Army. Representatives of First French Army conferred with staff officers at Headquarters 6th Army Group. On 30th June, SHAEF indicated over the telephone that the plan would be approved except for the phasing which must be speeded up to complete the operation within 10 days instead of 21 days and that a directive to effect immediate transfer would follow shortly. It was obvious that additional coordination would be necessary to fulfill the SHAEF directive within the specified limit of time.

SHAEF indicated to AFHQ in response to the latter's inquiry of 12 May 1945 that operational control of Army Detachment of the Alps would not be released until French troops withdrew from Italy. General Doyen had refused to withdraw from any occupied territory until authorized to do so by the French Government. AFHQ was particularly concerned because the likelihood of political difficulties arising in northwestern Italy had long been foreseen. Headquarters 6th Army Group was notified by SHAEF that an agreement had been reached to effect withdrawal of French forces from areas

FRENCH NATIONAL ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN
GERMANY AND AUSTRIA AS INDICATED ON 21 JUNE 1945



- | | |
|-------|--|
| ----- | International Boundaries |
| == | National Zone Boundaries |
| | Military District, US Zone |
| XXXXX | Limits of occupation by First French Army during initial operational phase |

Figure 26

east of Franco-Italian boundary of 1939 by 10 July. It is presumed that Headquarters 6th Army Group will be relieved of responsibility for the Army Detachment of the Alps at that time and control of such forces will pass to the French Government. This date coincides with the date for turnover of the French zone in Germany. Thus, when relieved of all operational responsibility, the mission of Headquarters 6th Army Group will have been concluded.

Redeployment Training received attention as early as mid-March. At that time, information was received by the Chief of Staff that a training command would be established in this theater for the purpose of training units that were to be redeployed directly to the Pacific or indirectly through the United States. It was expected that Headquarters 6th Army Group would be assigned the mission. On 25 March, at Phalsbourg, Colonel Miles W. Brewster, G-3 Plans Section of ETOUSA, briefed General Devers and his staff on Theater Redeployment Planning and stated that the Theater Tentative Basic Plan assigned the mission of Redeployment Training of all units, except those assigned or attached to USSTAF, as a responsibility of Headquarters 6th Army Group.

It was decided that a small group of officers from Headquarters 6th Army Group would be sent to Headquarters ETOUSA in Paris to read into the picture and to prepare plans and necessary directives for the new problem which would confront the 6th Army Group on VE Day. Accordingly, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Whitfield P. Shepard, and five other officers were selected and ordered to ETOUSA.

Upon arrival in Paris 1 April, study of the redeployment training problems and implications commenced. An analysis of the Redeployment Flow Chart, dated 5 April 1945, indicated that Headquarters 6th Army Group would be responsible for the training of 3360 units varying in size and type from divisions to small signal detachments of only a few men.

Representatives of Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces came to ETOUSA and were consulted on the problems they had met in training in the Zone of the Interior. The various Special Staff Sections of Headquarters Communications Zone were also consulted. As plans began to shape up additional specialized officer personnel was required and studies of requirements for training areas were made. Headquarters 6th Army Group's Basic Plan for Redeployment Training was submitted to Headquarters ETO on 10 May and was approved. Plans were progressing most favorably and the final draft of Headquarters 6th Army Group Training Memorandum No 1 was completed. This memorandum was based on AGF, ASF, and War Department training programs and directives.

On 13 May a new Redeployment Flow Chart dated 14 May 1945 was received. An analysis of the chart indicated that the total number

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of units that would come under control of Headquarters 6th Army Group for training was only 723, most of which were Service units, as compared to 3360 previously determined. This reduction in units was due to a tremendous speed up of the shipment of units from the theater as well as a decision that units scheduled for strategic reserve would remain under control of the Army of Occupation and Communications Zone until shipping for return to the States was available.

As a result of the reduction of the number of units available for training, General Eisenhower decided that the establishment of a special headquarters responsible for redeployment training was unnecessary. Instead it was decided that each major command would be responsible for training those units assigned or attached which were to be redeployed. Accordingly, on 2 June a conference was held at ETOUSA at which all major commands were represented and at which the G-3, ETOUSA announced the new policy on Redeployment Training. After turning over the material they had prepared to other appropriate headquarters, Headquarters 6th Army Group Redeployment Planning Staff was dissolved and returned to Heidelberg.

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CHAPTER TWELVEOCCUPATION OF GERMANY

Headquarters 6th Army Group commenced planning for the occupation of Germany in late September 1944 and carried it on until the termination of its mission in July 1945. The guiding principles and the missions assigned to 6th Army Group were set forth in the appreciations and outline plans issued by SHAEF for Operation 'Talisman', the Second 'Talisman' plan, dated 31 October 1944 and Operation 'Eclipse', dated 10 November 1944. The SHAEF plans outlined broadly the strategic areas to be seized to establish Allied military control in Germany, the occupational objectives and priorities for their accomplishment, and the general policies governing the occupation. Also designated by SHAEF was the general plan for organization of the final occupation. Because the situation as it might exist at the time of defeat and capitulation of Germany could not be forecast with certainty, SHAEF plans were general and designed to meet either a complete surrender by a central German authority or piecemeal capitulation upon collapse of centralized control. Detailed instructions covering limited aspects of occupation such as counter-intelligence, prisoners of war, displaced persons, public relations, signal communications and disarmament were set forth in memoranda related to the outline plans.

The SHAEF plan specified that Headquarters 6th Army Group would be withdrawn from Germany and control of Allied forces in the U. S. Zone would be consolidated under Headquarters 12th Army Group. Responsibility for coordination of planning rested with Headquarters 12th Army Group.

The first draft plan of the Joint Planning Staff of 25 November 1944, conformed to the principles and missions laid down by SHAEF plans and the operational situation as assumed by 12th Army Group. Operation 'Eclipse' was considered to be a continuation of the current military operations. It was assumed that, when the operation should commence upon German surrender or collapse, Allied Forces would be disposed in prolongation of the current zones of action with the bulk of forces in bridgehead areas east of the Rhine, and that Russian forces would not have occupied any considerable portion of Germany.

In designating the missions of Seventh Army and First French Army the tactical operations, strength, equipment of forces and supply lines were considered. Seventh Army was assigned the mission of making a deep thrust into the Nurnberg and Munich areas while First French Army protected its south flank and Line of Communications by blocking action along the east bank of the Rhine, in the Black Forest, and east in the Stuttgart area. The plan indicated a single axis of advance leading first to Nurnberg and then turning south to Munich in order to provide security for a single Line of

Communications and still leave Seventh Army sufficient strength upon reaching the Munich area to cope with the possibility of encountering sizeable German forces withdrawing from Italy. The mission of sealing the German-Swiss border had already been assigned to First French Army, in response to SHAEF directive cable of 16 September 1944.

Several questions of major importance concerning administrative organization in Germany which were not clearly defined in the SHAEF plan became apparent. The position of Communications Zone in Germany was clarified to the extent that it would be responsible for logistical support, but would have no area responsibility.

The Joint Planning Staff draft plan was revised and enlarged to include the clarification of the responsibility of Communications Zone in Germany and the SHAEF and 12th Army Group provisions for additional supervisory personnel to perform post-hostilities military government and disarmament functions. Also included was 12th Army Group's provision for a corps of 3 infantry divisions and 1 armored division of Third Army to assist Seventh Army in the Nurnberg-Regensburg area. The approved 'Eclipse' Outline Plan was issued under date of 5 February 1945 but distribution was delayed until 25 February 1945 when interpretation of SHAEF security restrictions had been clarified.

To conform to a change in 12th Army Group's plan which was necessitated by the altered tactical situation and to provide more guidance for Seventh Army in its planning, Alternate Outline plans were issued on 19 March 1945. The alternate plans provided for initial occupation of the Saar and establishment of Military Government in the State of Westmark by Seventh Army. One Corps of First French Army under this plan would relieve Seventh Army in the above areas during the redistribution of forces in the secondary phase of occupation. The strength of Seventh Army was designated as three Corps Headquarters and a total of 16 Divisions.

At the same time under date of 15 March 1945 a directive on the Tentative Basis for 'Eclipse' Planning was prepared by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and approved by the Army Group Commander. The directive cited the shortage of bridging equipment to cross both Seventh and First French Armies over the Rhine simultaneously and gave Seventh Army priority. It instructed Seventh Army to be prepared to direct one corps on Nurnberg, one corps on Regensburg and one corps on Munich. The latter corps was to dispatch a strong highly mobile force into Pforzheim-Donaueschingen-Immenstadt-Ulm area initially and to be followed by French forces which would relieve the mobile force of Seventh Army. The tentative planning directive designated that a mobile task force of one armored and one infantry division, and naval personnel to patrol Lake Constance, would cross the Rhine in the vicinity of Neuf Brisach and seal the Swiss border as far as Austria. Also one infantry division would cross the Rhine on available equipment and occupy the east bank of the Rhine and

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the Black Forest as far north as Karlsruhe. Other provisions were that one armored division and one infantry division of First French Army should cross the Rhine on Army Group order behind the right Corps of Seventh Army to occupy the Karlsruhe-Stuttgart area and relieve Seventh Army in Wurttemberg, permitting Seventh Army elements to move into Bavaria. The possible necessity of utilizing two French divisions to occupy the Saar to relieve Seventh Army was also included.

Specific instructions to cover more detailed aspects of the 'Eclipse' Operation were issued as annexes to the original outline plan, dated 5 February 1945. The annexes were prepared by the staff sections having primary interest and coordinated by G-3 Section.

A Revised Outline Plan for Operation 'Eclipse' was issued by Headquarters 6th Army Group dated 22 April 1945. This revision maintained the annexes in effect, unless superseded at that time, and rescinded the Alternate Plans previously issued. Suggestions received from SHAEF and Communications Zone ETOUSA designed to clarify certain of the missions of Communications Zone and the use and provision of specialist personnel for post-hostilities functions were incorporated in the revised plan. The outstanding points of revision were necessitated by changes in 12th Army Group's plan. 12th Army Group adopted the policy of transferring between Army Headquarters responsibility for areas and command of troop units located therein in order to effect the transition from the operational to the occupational phase while leaving troops in place. It was hoped that movement of troops and installations already engaged in occupational duties would thereby be held to a minimum.

The major change in organization for occupation of the U. S. Zone was that Headquarters Seventh Army would be responsible for the Western Military District which included all the U. S. Zone except Bavaria, instead of the Eastern Military District which would be organized by Third Army Headquarters. Other new conceptions from 12th Army Group plans which were incorporated in the revised plan were the adjustment of Wehrkreis boundaries to conform to political subdivisions and reconstitution of Wehrkreis organization if necessary to control, maintain and disband the German Armed Forces. To centralize control of military government along the lines of former German administration, corps headquarters were to be eliminated from the chain of command for military government and administrative purposes as early as possible.

Tactically, the execution of the 'Eclipse' plan was very much as anticipated and planned. Accomplishment of all objectives in the disarmament of Germany and control of occupied areas was not as complete and smooth in all cases as anticipated and expected. It is believed that such failure where it occurred is not the fault of the troop units involved, but is due to lack of timely dissemination of the extensive detailed instructions to permit their being studied

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and understood by units preoccupied with combat operations and to the lack of administrative headquarters to control the occupational forces in rear areas while the higher tactical headquarters focused their attention on completing the defeat of the German Armed Forces.

The need for an administrative headquarters to control areas in rear of the combat armies in the event that combat operations were carried on deep inside of Germany had been foreseen. In response to an inquiry SHAEF informed Headquarters 6th Army Group on 21 January 1945 that SHAEF could not furnish a headquarters for occupational control of rear areas of 6th Army Group such as 12th Army Group had in Fifteenth Army. Therefore, in compliance with SHAEF "Interim Directive for the Occupation of Germany" of 13 January 1945, an augmented corps headquarters was requested to execute the detailed planning and to provide coordination in occupation of rear areas in Germany. SHAEF message S78638 dated 11 February 1945 indicated that this request could not be favorably considered.

The provisions concerning specialist personnel for post-hostilities functions which were included in the "Eclipse" plans seemed to provide for adequate control of the occupation in those respects. In practice however, the static liaison staffs were a distinct failure. This was due first to the failure of higher headquarters to authorize an approved T/O & E for these staffs in sufficient time for them to be self-sufficient and perform their contemplated function; and secondly, the training which they received was based on the early conception of disarmament control using a dual staff organization with one staff to control German activities and the normal staff for the regular administration of lower troop echelons. Thus much of the visualized assistance for combat units in controlling the occupation of Germany was not available when required.

The discrepancies which occurred appear to have resulted from the conflict between operational necessity and administrative planning. The complexity of many problems of occupation and the necessity for an organization of personnel capable of handling them in order to effect a smooth transition from combat operations to occupational control of areas was appreciated by the administrative planners at the higher levels. However, in the operational view, all organizations and personnel available were engaged in the mission of defeating the enemy armed forces and could not be spared for occupational training or detailed planning until the primary mission had been completed. Therefore, although elaborate and detailed plans and policies were adopted at the higher levels, time for their complete study and comprehension was not available to lower echelons until hostilities were ended. Thus the original operational plans were followed and consolidation of the occupation developed after hostilities ceased.

The operational necessity of maintaining the greatest possible pressure on the fleeing enemy force to prevent organization of a coordinated defense required all available strength that front line units could muster to cover the very extended fronts assigned them. The unit frontages and speed of advance did not permit detachment of suitable forces for disarmament and similar purposes of control of civilian population when regiments were occupying towns at a rate of more than 30 per day, as occurred in many instances.

At lower echelons, liaison and continuity of policy were frequently lacking. The static liaison staff had been contemplated for use only at higher levels in larger centers to supervise control which would be disseminated through German administrative machinery. Under the circumstances of the defeat and complete occupation for Germany prior to collapse and surrender little German administrative machinery remained. Although details of plans and policies may in some instances not have been carried out at lower levels, the planning done during the winter and early spring was available immediately upon cessation of hostilities. Thus solution of few problems had to be developed during the transitional period of consolidation of occupational control.

12th Army Group used Headquarters Fifteenth Army to control and coordinate the occupation of areas of Germany in rear of the armies which were conducting the combat operations. As a solution of the problem of controlling rear areas in the zone of 6th Army Group SHAEF specified in cable FWD 17249 dated 22 February 1945 that Headquarters Fifteenth Army would relieve 6th Army Group of occupational responsibilities west of the Rhine. This change in area responsibilities would be effected by successive adjustments in inter-Army Group boundary as necessary. Headquarters Fifteenth Army was not prepared to take over immediately all of Germany west of the Rhine and when given the mission by Headquarters 12th Army Group, Fifteenth Army was established in the center of the Rhine Province to take over first from First Army then extend its area of control behind Ninth and Third Armies and finally to take over from Seventh and First French Armies on the south flank in the Saar and Pfalz. By the time Fifteenth Army was ready to relieve 6th Army Group in areas west of the Rhine on 25 and 27 April 1945 Seventh Army had advanced well beyond its bridgehead area and had responsibility for a line of communications and all the area as far east as the front lines which extended from Neuburg on the Danube southwest to the vicinity of the Austrian border.

The French Zone of Occupation was entirely a political matter of negotiations carried out at the highest governmental level. The uncertainty of the whole question however, seriously affected military operations and control of occupation. Acting on instructions of the French Provisional Government, French military commanders declined to yield any territory initially occupied by

French forces. Stuttgart, the capital of the State of Württemberg, had been captured by the French and had been previously designated in all 'Eclipse' plans as the location for the headquarters which would control the Western Military District of the U. S. Zone. (See Figures 26 and 27). Military Government and area control and administration were based on control superimposed upon and following the German administrative and control channels. The whole scheme for redistribution of occupational forces and organization and consolidation of control of the occupation of Germany were dependent on definition of the national zones once the decision of the Yalta Conference that the French would have a national zone of occupation had been announced.

After mid-April 1945 it became apparent that our forces might reach the Austro-German frontier ahead of forces under AFHQ. Responsibility for developing the policies and organization of the occupation of Austria had been assigned to AFHQ. It was agreed that SHAEF forces would continue pursuit of fleeing German remnants into Austria and occupy that area in accordance with SHAEF 'Eclipse' policies somewhat modified to meet the local situation in respect to Military Government. Headquarters 6th Army Group was designated to coordinate the implementation with 15th Army Group. G-5 teams were requested from AFHQ. Disarmament specialist personnel and a controlling headquarters could not be made available by AFHQ in the early phases of the occupation of Austria. In effect, the 'Eclipse' operation was carried across the frontier into the areas of Austria occupied by the SHAEF forces, and as such the occupation of Austria presented no unique conditions except that the bulk of the forces surrendered by German Army Group G were located in Austria.

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National Zones of Occupation in Germany and
Organization of U.S. Zone Under "Eclipse" Plan.



- International Boundaries
- == National Zone Boundaries
- Military District, U.S. Zone

Figure 27

RESTRICTED

4-6 Bon's Pass

SUBJECT FILE

World War, 1939-1945
U.S. Army, 6th Army Group, G-3 Section,
"WW II - Final Report," 1945 Daily